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On assemblages and things: fluidity, stability, causation stories 
and formation stories 
Abstract 
This paper conducts a dialogue, and creates a new synthesis, between two of the most 
influential ontological discourses in the field of sociology: assemblage theory and 
critical realism. The former proposes a focus on difference, fluidity and process, the 
latter a focus on stability and structure. Drawing on and assessing the work of 
Deleuze, DeLanda and Bhaskar, we argue that social ontology must overcome the 
tendency to bifurcate between these two poles and instead develop an ontology more 
suited to explaining complex social phenomena by accommodating elements of both 
traditions. Going beyond DeLanda’s recent work, we argue that a concept of causal 
types must be employed alongside a typology of structures to give us an ontology that 
can sustain sociology’s need for both formation stories and causation stories. We 
illustrate the necessity and value of our proposed synthesis by discussing MacKenzie’s 
recent empirical analysis of a high frequency trading firm. 
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On assemblages and things: fluidity, stability, and causation 
stories  
 
Social ontologies are systematic accounts of what kinds of phenomena are to be found 
in the social world and, in relatively abstract or general terms, how they operate. One 
of the challenges facing any social theorising that takes ontology as its task is 
accounting for the inherent and irreducible heterogeneity of social objects (Little 
2016). Social science necessarily deals simultaneously with agents, structures, 
relations, processes, and various other social dynamics. Successive theoretical 
positions have been inclined to resolve this problem of ontological complexity by 
bracketing or collapsing the heterogeneity of the social in one way or another through 
taking a certain element to be more basic than others; agents, structures, or relations, 
for example, become the fundamental quanta of social reality while other elements 
are redefined accordingly. Historically, this produces a pendulum swing in social 
theory between alternate resolutions of the problem of heterogeneity and 
complexity; a certain account becomes fashionable and dominant while others fall out 
of favor and retreat into the shadows only to be rediscovered later and rise to 
prominence again. As a result, the favoured elements in the ontologies secreted in 
social theory tend to oscillate, and in multiple dimensions: between structures and 
actors, objects and process, materiality and culture, relations and autonomous 
essences.  
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This paper focuses on one of these dimensions: the tension between object-focussed 
and process-focussed ontologies. This is not to say that the other dimensions are 
unimportant: their significance is widely discussed in the literature, and indeed we 
have contributed to those debates ourselves (e.g. Elder-Vass, 2010, 2012, 2017; 
Rutzou, 2017). But the object/process divide is less frequently addressed in the 
mainstream sociological theory literature and yet the tension between these two 
poles is of fundamental importance to understanding the social world.  
On the one hand, ontologies of fluidity have stressed the contingency and dynamism 
of the social world, typically seeing the world as composed of processes rather than 
objects or structures, and often neglecting the need to explain the stabilities of social 
reproduction (Abbott, 2016; Bennett, 2010; Coole and Frost, 2010; Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1983, 1988). On the other hand, structure-oriented ontologies have tended 
to portray the world as composed of persistent forms, definite boundaries, essences, 
and consistent causal capacities, at the expense of the more chaotic and dynamic 
aspects of the social world (Bhaskar, 1975; Bryant, 2011; Harman, 2016). This is not to 
say that either tradition ignores social change or cases of social stability, nor that 
either is incapable of explaining social change or stability. Rather, the distinction is 
that process-oriented ontologies tend to explain social outcomes as being produced 
by process and theorise structural forces as unstable products of fleeting interactions, 
while structure-oriented ontologies tend to explain social outcomes as being 
produced by relatively stabilised structures and see process as secondary. 
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 In response to this problem, our strategy will be to stage an encounter between what 
we consider to be the most developed and coherent enunciations of the process and 
structure approaches to social ontology - assemblage theory (DeLanda, 2006, 2016; 
Deleuze and Guattari, 1983, 1986, 1988) and critical realism (Archer, 1995; Bhaskar, 
1975, 1979; Elder-Vass, 2010). Assemblage theory is a process oriented ontology that 
is driven by what we call the problematic of origins – forefronting explanations of how 
things come to be the way they are. Critical realism, by contrast, is a structure 
oriented ontology that is driven by the problematic of causal power – forefronting 
explanations of how things have the capacity to influence the world. By comparing, 
criticising, reformulating and elaborating elements of both traditions this paper seeks 
to construct a more open and flexible synthesis, and one that can address both of 
these problematics.  
The productivity of such an engagement is not a novel idea. Coole and Frost (2010), 
Bryant (2011), DeLanda (2006, 2011, 2016), and Harman (2016) have either engaged 
with, or indicated their influence by, the work of Roy Bhaskar, while on the side of 
critical realism Elder-Vass (2008, 2015), Little (2016), Rutzou (2017), and Decoteau 
(2018) have also argued for the need for a productive engagement between these 
traditions as a means of developing more suitable ontological models for social 
theory. This practice of making such connections between related but in some 
respects conflicting schools of thought should be familiar to sociological theorists 
6 
 
through examples such as Sewell’s productive confrontation of the work of Giddens 
and Bourdieu (Sewell, 1992).  Yet, despite these connections having been drawn, what 
has been lacking until now is a fully coherent engagement and synthesis between 
assemblage theory and critical realism that unfolds their points of convergence and 
divergence, and demonstrates the benefits that a conjunction between them might 
bring. Manuel DeLanda has made the largest steps towards bringing these traditions 
together, but we will argue that his work is hampered by a failure to embrace the 
realist concept of causal types. Arguing from a broadly critical realist position, but one 
that is open to the merits of assemblage theory, this paper advocates a synthesis 
between the two that combines Bhaskar’s account of stratification, real causal powers 
and generative mechanisms, the concepts of assemblage, strata and territorialization 
in the work of Deleuze and Guattari, and DeLanda’s notion of parameters. The result 
of this encounter, we believe, is an ontology better suited to accounting for the 
complex and dynamic processes of change and stability within social phenomena.  
While the place of ontology has always been controversial in social science, perhaps 
the most important function of ontology for social researchers is that it directs focus 
towards some ways of thinking about the phenomena that they study, and away from 
others. As a framework for study ontology can perform both a sensitising and a 
regulating role, functioning akin to a guide that provides a systematic framework for 
avoiding improvised, implicit, incoherent, or logically irresponsible hypotheses. While 
ontology is often equated with a priori theorizing, this need not be the case. We argue 
that social ontologies can be evaluated against an empirical criterion: they should 
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encompass all those phenomena identified by good empirical studies. This process 
may seem circular insofar as social research is influenced by ontology, and ontology is 
judged by the findings of social research. Our view, however, is that empirical studies 
can break out of this circularity when they identify phenomena that challenge their 
presumptive ontology, secreting either explicit or implicit challenges to the ontology 
that guided them in their results (Elder-Vass, 2007). An example from assemblage 
theory is perhaps Latour's introduction of values and institutions in his An Inquiry into 
the Modes of Existence (Latour, 2013), despite having dismissed social or cultural 
structures in his earlier work as black boxes to be eliminated by opening them (Latour, 
2005). On the critical realist side we could count, from our own work, the addition of 
complexes of practices to explain the ontology of economic form in Profit and Gift in 
the Digital Economy (Elder-Vass, 2016). We can therefore judge ontologies against 
substantive research at the same time as we assess substantive research against 
ontological criteria. Where discrepancies arise, there can be no a priori presumption 
as to which is in error, but a discrepancy at least indicates that further work is 
required. Where there is harmony, both the research and the ontology are 
corroborated and mutually supported.  
On this basis, we argue that a great deal of explanatory work in the social sciences 
needs an ontological framework like that proposed here, particularly given that the 
vast majority of social phenomena are produced in circumstances where relatively 
stably reproduced familiar social objects interact with far more dynamic and transient 
objects. It would be a vast undertaking to validate this claim by reference to the entire 
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body of social research, but we aim to make a small beginning by validating our model 
against a single high-quality empirical study – Donald MacKenzie’s recent case study 
concerning high-frequency stock trading (MacKenzie, 2017). Mackenzie’s study reveals 
and depends on both types of phenomena. This provides the base from which we 
introduce and evaluate assemblage theory and contemporary critical realism. We then 
move onto questions of synthesis by exploring the work of DeLanda, presenting our 
own synthesis of the positions, and finally illustrating the value of our solution by 
returning to Mackenzie’s empirical study for corroboration (MacKenzie, 2017). 
One further note before beginning: both assemblage theory and critical realism are 
general or philosophical ontologies that aim to encompass both the natural and the 
social. While we will favour social examples, many arguments from both Deleuze and 
Guattari (hereafter D&G) and Bhaskar are intended to apply to both. For this reason, 
we will use non-social examples where the original authors did so or where such 
examples illustrate a point more clearly, while recognizing the limitations of such 
examples. Furthermore, both ontologies recognise material objects as part of the 
‘social’ world, problematizing the natural/social distinction and arguing for a 
fundamental unity across ontological realms (c.f. Latour, 1993).  
 
Fluidity and stability in practice 
In thinking through the problem of ontological heterogeneity, Donald MacKenzie’s 
detailed historical account of Automated Trading Desk (ATD), a high-frequency stock 
9 
 
trading firm, offers a fitting illustration of the need for new and better ontological 
models (MacKenzie, 2017). ATD was founded in 1989 by two partners, who employed 
two programmers to write software that could predict stock prices and place 
automated trades. Over the early years of the firm it underwent various changes, such 
as switching from a business model oriented to supplying services to other trading 
firms to becoming a trading firm itself and converting the programmers into 
stockholders during a period when the firm was unable to pay their wages and so 
compensated them in stock instead. This is not untypical; many small firms go through 
similar changes, modifying their form, their objectives, and in the majority of cases 
collapsing entirely. Here we have different and competing social structures coming 
into being from scratch then undergoing structural fluidity as they seek to adapt to 
their environment until (with luck and judgement) they are able to stabilise – 
temporarily, at least – in a viable form. At any one point, the firm has a certain form, 
and may exercise causal influence arising from that form, but during the stages of its 
development that form is often dynamic and unstable.  
This sort of case poses a challenge to ontologies that stress the endurance of objects 
and structures, such as critical realism.0Fi As Hirschman and Reed have argued, critical 
realists (and many other sociologists) tend to develop explanations that deal with 
relations between existing objects or structures, but this needs to be supplemented 
with “formation stories”, which account for how objects get formed in the first place 
(Hirschman and Reed, 2014).1Fii  As they point out, the assemblages approach is more 
focused upon origins – and encourages us to think of the new and evolving firm in 
10 
 
much more fluid terms. This is not to say that critical realism entirely neglects origins. 
Margaret Archer in particular has argued that social ontology needs to incorporate 
history. Her concept of the morphogenetic cycle - in which actions are influenced by 
the structural context which in turn leads to either processes of reproduction or 
transformation of that context – is one type of formation story (Archer, 1995: 154–
61). While Archer’s concept is in principle able to deal with quite discontinuous 
change, realist applications typically assume that a reasonably stabilised structure 
exists already such that it can be incrementally changed, rather than conceiving of 
structures that are inherently heterogeneous, fluid, unstable, or yet to exist. 
If developmental processes need to be built into social ontology, as assemblage 
theory implies, these processes need to be understood relationally rather than 
linearly. It is impossible to make sense of ATD’s history without recognising the 
enormous influence of other related structures, including the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE), which had already existed for almost 200 years when ATD was 
founded, and which had stabilised both as an organisation and as a set of practices 
regulating much of the stock trading in the US. An important part of ATD’s story was 
the work it had to do to fit into or work around the far stabler pre-existing structure of 
the NYSE and its effects. That is not to say that the NYSE was completely unchanging, 
and in fact ATD was one of the players whose actions influenced those changes – but 
nor is it true that ATD itself was completely fluid, even in its early phases: there were 
significant elements of continuity of location, personnel, legal form and general 
objectives. Still, in an important sense, ATD’s story is a story of interaction between 
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relatively fluid and relatively stable social structures. These relatively stable structures 
constitute a challenge to assemblage theory, with its tendency to class all social 
phenomena as ephemeral and fluid in the service of accounting for their contingent 
history. 
The formation story of ATD, in other words, depends on elements of both stability and 
fluidity. On the one hand, ATD’s entire business was premised on the possibility of 
exploiting new forms of technology, which themselves changed radically over the 
course of MacKenzie’s narrative, generating and closing down opportunities in 
unprecedently short periods of time. On the other, the institution of trading shares of 
joint stock companies on an exchange and many aspects of the legal framework for 
doing so (though by no means all) were relatively stable across the period of the study 
and it was in response to this that these new forms of technology evolved. The 
institutions of joint stock companies and stock trading also contribute to the 
widespread recurrence of such companies and indeed of stock exchanges as 
organisational structures, providing a context that massively increases the stability of 
such structures. They are also central, however, to causation stories in which the 
ongoing capacity of companies like ATD to trade stock is explained, as well as to the 
formation stories in which the development of ATD is explained. 
No doubt a study of a different case would show different elements of fluidity and 
stability across different contexts, and no doubt the balance between the two would 
differ significantly from case to case. But MacKenzie’s study and the ontological 
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questions it raises are already more than sufficient to demonstrate that ontology must 
find room for thinking both fluidity and stability, and both formation and ongoing 
causation in order to understand the complexity of such phenomena. With this in 
mind, we will now turn to the alternative ontological approaches to assemblages 
before returning to ATD as a yardstick of these alternative approaches.  
Assemblage theory: Deleuze and Guattari 
While there have been many assemblage theorists, Deleuze and Guattari (D&G) 
were pioneers in theorizing assemblages, as a means of rethinking ontology by 
focusing upon difference. Ontology is defined in their work, not by reference to static 
forms, hierarchies, or essences, but by multiplicities, processes, and flows. Objects, 
entities, properties, even Being itself is constituted by difference and heterogeneity, 
multiplicity, rupture, diverse and diffuse relations, linkages, mutations, processes, 
individuals, and becomings (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 5f). Within this ontological 
context the concept of assemblage operates to challenge and critique traditional 
accounts of structure, totality, and causation by reconstructing an ontology around 
continuous variation, hybrid phenomena, dynamic change, growth, discontinuity, and 
contingency (c.f. Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 97-100), while providing a means to 
theorize and understand the relational interactions of component parts and wholes by 
attending to the way different things come and are held together i.e. assembled. 
Writing about assemblages, let alone trying to synthesise the theory with another 
tradition such as critical realism, presents a number of challenges. Assemblage theory, 
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particularly in the case of D&G, explicitly attempts to avoid standard and familiar 
images instead attempting to structure an entirely new philosophical perspective. This 
intentionally leaves the reader somewhat disoriented by a proverbial assault upon 
their vocabulary. Although there is a consistency and coherency to the underlying 
thought, their writings are designed to defy summary and render systematicity near 
impossible (Massumi, 1996). Even the word assemblage carries within itself a 
fundamental ambiguity: as an attempt to translate the original French agencement it 
refers to both the action of fitting together a set of components, and the result of 
such an action (DeLanda, 2016: 9). As a consequence the word itself encompasses 
aspects of both process and structure with connotations that include  “dispose, 
arrange, combine, unite, compose, constitute, ... connect, order” (extracted from a 
longer list in Law, 2004: 167 n. 37).  
For D&G, assemblages and other systems should not be thought of as unities, but 
rather as compositions, defined by difference. Assemblages are not structures but 
rather ‘living’ arrangements, unsettled and mobile by nature, rather than fixed or 
hierarchical. Instead of having a stable form or an essence that indicates an underlying 
unity or homogeneity, an assemblage is characterized by an unstable set of interior 
and exterior relations between parts and wholes. Assemblages are open and 
heterogeneous systems –diffuse networks which connect together different 
components into complex ensembles that resemble “rhizomes” (Deleuze and 
Guattari, 1988). Universities, for example, are by no means stable or even stably-
bounded social objects, as they morph in response to changes in the political and 
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economic environment, demonstrated recently by shedding functions to private 
contractors that used to be considered core to their identities (Bacevic, 2018). As 
clusters of independent but interrelated parts, assemblages encompass the 
interaction between different types of social things ranging from material forms 
(persons, bodies, and things c.f. Deleuze and Guattari 1983), practices (action, 
activities, agencies c.f. Deleuze and Sacher-Masoch, 1991), knowledge (epistemes, 
scientific statements, concepts, discourse c.f. Deleuze 2014), social organizations 
(capital, culture, politics, bureaucracies, institutions and organizations c.f. Deleuze and 
Guattari 1983, 1988) and forms of expression (gestures, words, music, affect, desire 
c.f. Deleuze and Guattari 1986, 1988). An assemblage operates as the intersection and 
conjunction - the coalescence - of these different components; a mobile army of 
multiplicities characterized by varied interactions and changing liaisons. Assemblages 
resist all accounts that would ascribe them – or the phenomena they generate – to 
one true source or uniting principle (May, 1997: 177). Rather, Deleuze suggests, with 
his characteristic metaphorical flair: “...the assemblage's only unity is that of a co-
functioning: it is a symbiosis, a 'sympathy'. It is never filiations which are important, 
but alliances, alloys; these are not successions, lines of descent, but contagions, 
epidemics, the wind” (Deleuze and Parnet, 2002: 69).  
Where concepts such as structure or systems in social science lend themselves to 
explanations of how social life is shaped into recurring and consistent forms, 
assemblages resist this logic. There is no possibility of reduction to some basic or 
underlying property or mechanism such as the Oedipal complex, capitalism, culture, 
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or nation state which can explain (or explain away) heterogeneity by reference to an 
underlying unified whole. Indeed, at the heart of assemblage theory is a critique of the 
reductionism inherent to traditional forms of totalizing analysis from psychoanalysis to 
linguistics to Marxism. Taking psychoanalysis, linguistics, and Marxism as examples, 
each are argued to posit either a primordial and universal mechanism (the Oedipus 
Complex), generative structure (Chomsky’s grammaticality; Levi Strauss’ binaries), or 
internal relationship (Capitalism, worker-owner) which governs and explains the 
whole and forms the basis for systematic scientific thought. In contrast D&G are quick 
to emphasize the inherent heterogeneity of the whole. Against Marxism, for example, 
D&G paint capitalism as schizophrenic rather than homogenous (and therefore 
“paranoiac”), and return to, and radicalize, the language of the communist manifesto 
in which capitalism is described as the uninterrupted disturbance in which: “all fixed, 
fast-frozen relations, with their train of ancient and venerable prejudices and 
opinions, are swept away” and “all that is solid melts into air…” (Marx and Engels, 
2000: 248). In contrast to totalizing forms of explanation the language of assemblage 
draws attention to the manner in which different things tend to become integrated 
and entangled and yet still remain decentered in their “core”; parts which are 
independent of each other, but which function together (for a time anyway) providing 
a degree of both contingency and recurrence (Deleuze and Guattari, 1986: 37). For 
D&G ontology consists in a complex interplay between heterogeneity and 
homogeneity, dynamism and recurrence, but heterogeneity and dynamism always 
seem to have the upper hand. 
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Structure and depth in Deleuze and Guattari 
The appeal of assemblage theory lies in its emphasis upon processes and 
particularities. It provides ontological warrant and a conceptual framework for writing 
complex and non-linear formation stories, which avoid generating unifying narratives. 
However, it also presents a number of issues. For many commentators, the focus 
upon relations, change, contingency, and difference seems to go too far, to the point 
at which the radical project of D&G melts everything into air (or perhaps “the wind”); 
the result being what appears to be an ineffable and diffuse ontology in which 
everything turns to smoke the moment we try to grasp hold of it (Norrie, 2009: 192–
212). But a closer reading of D&G also reveals elements of structure, strata, stability, 
and depth. In D&G assemblages are defined along two dimensions: one horizontal and 
the other vertical. On the horizontal axis, entities are comprised of “a machinic 
assemblage of bodies, of actions and passions … [and] collective assemblage[s] of 
enunciation, of acts and statements” – what we might think of as their parts (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 1988: 88). The second (and often neglected) dimension is a vertical axis 
which is concerned with the operations that stabilize and make “coherent” 
(territorialize), or destabilize and make “incoherent” (deterritorialize) structures, 
entities, and phenomena, giving rise to different forms of strata and stratification (for 
example codings, symbols, hierarchies, power, and genealogies). These two 
dimensions define the tension inherent to assemblages as wholes that exist in a state 
between stability and instability: stable insofar as the existence of certain forces is 
able to maintain the cohesion of the whole, unstable insofar as these forces are 
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contingent. Indeed, it is characteristic of D&G’s work to portray things as stable and 
dynamic to different degrees.  
Strata are viewed as levels, populated with relatively stable objects composed of parts 
that themselves are drawn from the populations of substrata (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1988: 79–80). Because of this strata can be grouped, and they suggest three 
groupings: “physico-chemical, organic, and anthropomorphic” (i.e. cultural) (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 1988: 584), all of which are highly suggestive of the sort of level 
structure common in realist ontologies (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 66–70; Elder-
Vass, 2010). Strata are built on substrata, employing the materials provided by the 
substratum, and forming them into elements and compounds as a result of the 
operation of abstract machines, sometimes referred to as diagrams (Deleuze, 1988: 
34, 39).  
The concept of an abstract machine is somewhat obscure, but it provides a potentially 
instructive set of parallels with critical realism. 2Fiii Abstract machines do not exist as 
concrete realities that can be isolated from the form they take, but bring together 
diverse assemblages under a particular regime or order (May, 2005: 141). One 
difficulty in defining the abstract machine is situating its relation to the machine. A 
machine is, loosely speaking, a kind of pattern and/or driver of the possibilities that a 
given assemblage faces for productive interaction with other assemblages, particularly 
those interactions that lead to its own further development. If a machine is a 
pattern/driver of possibilities for a given assemblage, then an abstract machine would 
seem to be an equivalent pattern/driver for a wider set of assemblages.  For example, 
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Deleuze interprets  Foucault’s concept of Panopticism  as a diagram or abstract 
machine in the sense that it is a general pattern of the use of architecture to provide 
optical possibilities of surveillance that can help to mould human behaviour, a pattern 
that is found across a wide range of institutional buildings and not just the prisons that 
provided the initial model for the concept (Deleuze, 1988: 34; Foucault, 1991: 205). 
 
A more profound difficulty is the ontological status of abstract machines. They are 
“Abstract, singular, and creative, here and now, real yet nonconcrete, actual yet non-
effectuated” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 594). D&G situate abstract machines in the 
virtual, a concept drawn from Bergson that refers to an ontological domain that is real 
without being strictly actual, but nevertheless somehow enveloped in the actual 
(DeLanda and Harman, 2017: 60). If we may take the actual as referring to those 
things and events that exist in the ordinary material sense, the “real but not actual” 
generally refers (in both Bhaskar and Deleuze) to features of the world that are not 
instantiated in actual things. DeLanda gives the example of dispositions of things that 
are not currently manifested, such as the power that a knife has to cut, when it isn’t 
actually cutting anything, but this is drawn from Bhaskar’s scheme, not D&G’s 
(DeLanda and Harman, 2017: 68) (cf Bhaskar, 1978: 252). Similarly, “Abstract 
machines operate within concrete assemblages” (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 593), 
and so are in a sense enfolded within actual things. Indeed, this is the only kind of 
existence that D&G allow them, as “There is no abstract machine, or machines, in the 
sense of a Platonic idea, transcendent, universal, eternal” (Deleuze and Guattari, 
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1988: 593).   
Even by the standards of D&G, the ontology of abstract machines and diagrams is 
extraordinarily obscure. They are ascribed the status of being virtual, and yet always 
exist as features of actual assemblages, leaving it unclear just what it means for them 
to be virtual. They are described sometimes merely as patterns, but at others as 
having causal influence: in his book on Foucault, Deleuze claims that diagrams are 
“continually churning up matter and functions in a way likely to create change”, that 
they make history, and act “as a non-unifying immanent cause” but then immediately 
draws back to say that “the abstract machine is like the cause of the concrete 
assemblages that execute its relations” (Deleuze, 1988: 35–6, emphasis added). And 
yet is it unclear how these patterns could be causal, or if they are not, in what respect 
they are “like” causation. Perhaps the clearest explanation can be derived from the 
example they give of DNA, although some interpolation is required to fill in the gaps. 
An organism’s DNA is made up of repeating nucleotides organised in a specific 
sequences or patterns. DNA provides a series of instructions that influences and 
restricts the development of the larger organism (formation story) and accordingly the 
behaviours of the resulting assemblage (causation story), both by enabling some 
developmental paths and excluding others. While this seems to express the force of 
abstract machines, the analogy is troublesome. First, it is not the pattern as such that 
shapes the development of the organism but the material instantiation of the pattern, 
the structure of DNA itself, and so it is unclear what role the pattern as such is 
supposed to be playing, although there is a hint that it defines the alternative 
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possibilities for the assemblage (Deleuze, 1988: 37). This leaves the ontological status 
of these patterns extremely unclear. In what sense is there an abstract machine that is 
any sense ontologically distinct from the many strings of similar DNA found in a 
particular organism, or the many strings of somewhat less similar DNA found in 
multiple organisms of the same species? The consequence of this ambiguity seems to 
be that causation and formation stories unhelpfully blur together by placing emphasis 
upon patterns as a means of avoiding ontological questions.  We will argue below that 
these issues are resolved much more satisfactorily in critical realism with its emphasis 
upon causal mechanisms. 
 
Critical realism 
Despite many differences in orientation, a surprisingly fruitful dialogue can be 
had between D&G and critical realism (Bryant, 2011; DeLanda, 2006, 2011, 2016; 
Little, 2016; Rutzou, 2017). While it is tempting for realists to reject outright the 
outrageously heterogeneous ontology of D&G there are some important resonances 
between the two particularly when it comes to the emphasis on complexity and causal 
over-determination (Rutzou, 2017). Both philosophies are concerned with the 
concrete analysis of concrete situations and focus upon how diverse elements interact 
to produce a given outcome. Both are grounded in a rejection of causal laws. Both are 
concerned to avoid reductionism and emphasise the necessity of a “dialectical” and 
“relational” approach to social ontology. Both stake their claims on an ontology of 
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open systems. Yet, centrally, CR and D&G depart on the issue of how structures 
should be defined and understood.  
The central gesture of CR is to assert depth structures: levels of reality that are 
stable and exist out of phase with the often chaotic empirical surface. Roy Bhaskar, 
the leading advocate of the philosophy of critical realism, articulates this 
differentiation and stratification by reference to an ontological distinction between 
levels of the empirical (experiences), the actual (which includes all events, whether 
they are experienced or not), and the real (which includes the actual but also causal 
mechanisms that are not currently instantiated in the actual) (Bhaskar, 1975: 56). 
Bhaskar himself is a little unclear on the relation between structures and mechanisms, 
so we rely here on our own developments of his work. Structures, for us, are objects 
(broadly construed) in the natural and social worlds with causal powers that are 
emergent in the sense that they are not possessed by the parts of the structure, even 
collectively, unless and until they are organised into a structure of this type (Elder-
Vass, 2010: 16–23). Queues, for example, have the power to serialise access to a 
resource, but the people who are the parts of a queue at a given moment would not 
have this power if they were not organised as a queue. Objects have the powers and 
properties that they do by virtue of generative mechanisms, which in the simplest 
cases can be seen as processes of interaction between the parts of an object that 
produce its causal powers. Queues function because the people in them stand in 
order of arrival and move forward in the same order without which it would cease to 
be a queue and become something like a mob. This account of structure and 
22 
 
mechanisms is further complicated in that structures may exist at different depths and 
may vary in their powers and properties accordingly. The power of queues depends on 
their internal structure and processes but those processes in turn depend on the 
participants being positioned in a larger normative system that conditions them to 
follow those processes (Elder-Vass, 2010: 146–8).  
Perhaps the key to making sense of this ontology is the relationship between 
actual structures and mechanisms on the one hand, and those that Bhaskar thinks of 
as real but not actual on the other. Actual objects or structures exist in the ordinary 
sense of the word – as material things, or at least based in material substrates – and 
events are changes in such things so also belong in the realm of the actual. Causal 
powers are actualised in such objects, as a product of generative mechanisms which 
are actualised in interactions between their parts. Hence there is a sense in which 
structures, powers and mechanisms all appear within the domain that Bhaskar calls 
the actual. In also placing these in the non-actual element of the domain of the real 
Bhaskar is asserting that there is something important about generative mechanisms 
that is not captured in their actualisations. This can be expressed most clearly as a 
counterfactual: if an object was to exist that was composed of certain types of parts 
organised into certain types of relations with each other then its parts could interact 
in a certain way to generate a certain causal power. This counterfactual may be true 
irrespective of whether any such objects exist in the actual domain. It is real but not 
actual (Elder-Vass, 2010: 45–6). The argument also entails a commitment to causal 
types: there may be multiple actual objects that fit the counterfactual by virtue of 
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possessing relevantly similar parts and relational structures, and any actual object that 
fits the counterfactual will have the related mechanisms and powers (Elder-Vass, 
2012: 125–31). 
In Bhaskar such structures critically depend on their relations and interactions; all 
the more so in the social world (Rutzou, 2017). Through those relations causal powers 
can be exercised as various structures influence, interact and interfere with one 
another, resulting in mechanisms being ‘triggered’, ‘actualized’, or ‘realized’ in 
different ways. In open systems, i.e. outside of the laboratory and comprising the vast 
majority of the world, the operation of these mechanisms cannot be understood as a 
closed equation of isolated events and regularities of the kind that positivist social 
scientists sought. Instead, they are seen as a series of constellations and conjunctions, 
‘impure forms’ in which different structures and mechanisms interact to produce 
novel and emergent results (Steinmetz, 2004: 388). Because of this, different levels of 
structure, different mechanisms and powers can be operating concurrently without 
being manifest let alone empirically measurable; they may in fact only be known 
through their effects and in highly context-sensitive ways (Bhaskar, 1978: 252). They 
may sometimes produce partial regularities in the social world but these depend on 
the contingent reproduction of relatively similar configurations of causal forces that 
do not obstruct the mechanism producing the regularity. Following this, CR has 
emphasized that causation needs to be understood ‘in the wild’, i.e. in open systems 
which are heterogeneous and complex (Little, 2016; Steinmetz, 2004). Yet this still 
depends upon situating causation within a depth ontology. Indeed, the goal of the 
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critical realist is to penetrate and uncover the deeper, hidden, mediated and not 
immediately perceptible networks of tendencies, relations and mechanisms of nature 
which operate behind and govern events, rather than remaining at the shallow 
surface of experience, appearance, and regularity.  Critical realist causal explanations 
seek to identify actualised mechanisms and then – implicitly at least – to abstract from 
them to the real but not actual ‘structures’ that constitute their conditions of 
possibility and are realised in different counterfactuals. 
There are echoes here of D&G’s abstract machines, not least in the sense that 
Bhaskar explicitly locates causal powers in the real but not actual (Bhaskar, 1978: 46, 
56, 119, 252n). Actual things, for critical realists, do have causal powers, but there is 
also an aspect of causal power that is real beyond any instantiation in actual things. It 
may be true, for example, that a certain DNA sequence (suitably located in an 
embryological context) would have a tendency to produce a certain sort of organism, 
and the truth or falsity of claims like this one is independent of whether or not such a 
DNA sequence actually is instantiated in an organism – or ever has been (Elder-Vass, 
2010: 46). Still, despite the difference in principle, in practice the two accounts 
converge: the DNA sequence, for critical realists too, can only bring about these 
results when it is instantiated in an actual organism. We argue, however, that 
Bhaskar’s account is more powerful. . It eliminates the ontological puzzle created by 
calling abstract machines virtual yet insisting they are only present in the actual, by 
locating generative mechanisms both in the actual, where they have actual effects, 
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and in a different form in the real but not actual, where they stand as potentials of all 
members of a given causal type.  
Critical realism’s account of causation not only resembles that of assemblage 
theory, it provides an important corrective. CR offers a robust theory of causation that 
promises an explanation of both the contingency and recurrence of phenomena in the 
natural and social world and clarifies the relationship between actual and virtual that 
remains ambiguous within assemblage theory. However, the relationship between 
causation, diversity, and dynamism within CR remains relatively under-theorized and 
as a consequence expositions of CR tend to fall back on models that emphasise 
homogeneity. By contrast with D&G’s orientation to the biological and the social, 
causation is often filtered through the lens of natural science in general, and often 
chemistry and physics in particular. The result is that its theory and models of 
causation seem to place emphasis upon mechanisms requiring 'things' or ‘structures’ 
to be of consistent and stable types. This creates a degree of ambiguity as to whether 
the CR account of causation is committed to an ontology of essences and kinds 
(DeLanda, 2002; Rutzou, 2017). If we were to think of ontology as a spectrum it seems 
CR tends towards a structure-oriented ontology grounded in forms of unity while 
assemblage theory advocates for a process-oriented ontology characterized by forms 
of difference. 
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DeLanda’s solution 
Although these ontologies of fluidity and stability, of formation and causation, are 
often seen as antithetical, there is another possibility: that each describes important 
aspects of reality, all of which ought to be included in a fuller ontology. Manuel 
DeLanda is one of the few realist assemblage theorists and recognises the need for an 
ontology that has room not only for the uniqueness and contingency of fleeting things 
and causal configurations, but also for the existence of systematic similarities between 
the features and causal capacities of things, some of which are persistent or stable 
(DeLanda and Harman, 2017: 20). His work, and particularly his recent book 
Assemblage Theory (2016), can at least in part be seen as an attempt to address this 
challenge. As a self-proclaimed realist (DeLanda, 2016: 138), who also sees Deleuze as 
a realist (DeLanda, 2002: 4), his orientation to these problems has a great deal in 
common with ours. However, there is a sense in which the “contrast space” (DeLanda, 
2002: 164–5) of DeLanda’s (and Deleuze’s) ontology remains very different from 
critical realism’s. While their ontologies are primarily responses to the problematic of 
origins – how do things come to be the way they are? – critical realism’s is a response 
to the problematic of causal power – how can things have causal influence? – and this 
has a significant effect on their content as well as their orientation. One tends to 
produce formation stories, the other causation stories (cf Hirschman and Reed, 2014). 
The first part of DeLanda’s solution lies in his adaptation of Deleuze’s concept of 
assemblages. Like Deleuze (he claims) but unlike some other assemblage theorists 
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such as Latour (Elder-Vass, 2015), he sees assemblages as contingent but persisting 
historical individuals with part-whole structures. Deleuze’s assemblage theory, he 
argues, “was meant to apply to a wide variety of wholes constructed from 
heterogeneous parts. Entities ranging from atoms and molecules to biological 
organisms, species and ecosystems may be usefully treated as assemblages and 
therefore as entities that are products of historical processes” (DeLanda, 2006: 3). . On 
this account, assemblages are hierarchically structured entities composed of other 
assemblages (DeLanda, 2006: 3) – another parallel with critical realism, as we 
understand it (e.g. Elder-Vass, 2010: 19). 
Unlike Deleuze, but like critical realists, DeLanda also invokes the concept of 
emergence to explain the properties of assemblages (DeLanda and Harman, 2017: 23). 
Emergent properties are “the properties of a whole caused by the interactions 
between its parts” and if a whole has such properties they cannot be reduced to 
properties of the parts (DeLanda, 2016: 9).3Fiv Such properties depend on the properties 
of the parts, but they can also act back on the parts (DeLanda, 2016: 71). Given that 
assemblages are composed of other smaller assemblages and that this is a recursive or 
nested structure, this means that properties emerge at many different levels 
(DeLanda, 2002: 171).  
For many Deleuzeans, and even in Deleuze himself, emphasis is placed on the 
inherently fluid and transient aspects of assemblages. But, as we have seen, Deleuze 
also makes space in his ontology for strata – which DeLanda interprets as more stable 
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substances or structures that form the environment in which assemblages develop 
and operate (DeLanda, 2016: 8, 23). DeLanda, however, argues in Assemblage Theory 
for “a different version of the concept of assemblage, a concept with knobs that can 
be set to different values to yield either strata or assemblages (in the original sense)” 
(DeLanda, 2016: 3). DeLanda’s assemblages, in other words, can be ranged across a 
continuum, in which the more stable things that Deleuze calls strata form one end of a 
scale and the most transient and unstable assemblages the other (although the 
continuum is perhaps multi-dimensional).4Fv  
The position of an assemblage in a range like this, by comparison with other 
assemblages, can be (vaguely) ordered, and this ordering is described by what 
DeLanda calls a parameter. In common usage, a parameter is a variable (usually 
quantitative) that describes or specifies a characteristic or state of a system. D&G 
gesture towards this idea with the concept of coefficients but devote no more than a 
few sentences to the concept, which DeLanda has developed much further (Deleuze 
and Guattari, 1988: 595). For the sake of illustrating the concept, imagine that we 
have a scale from 0 to 10, where a higher value corresponds to a more permanent 
assemblage. We might assign a parameter value of 3 to ATD in its early stages, or a 
mob in front of a parliament building, and a parameter value of 7 to the New York 
Stock Exchange or the parliament building itself. These numeric values are arbitrary, 
but they correspond to a real feature: ATD really is less permanent than the NYSE, and 
a mob really is more transient than a queue or a building. While DeLanda uses the 
concept of parameter in a variety of ways, the core version is of different individual 
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assemblages forming a population in which differences between individuals 
correspond to different parameter settings (DeLanda, 2016: 56–7). 
In principle there may be many different parameters, but DeLanda picks out two in 
particular, drawn from D&G’s work. The first is the degree of territorialization5Fvi or 
deterritorialization of the assemblage. Territorializing processes “stabilize the identity 
of an assemblage, by increasing its degree of internal homogeneity or the degree of 
sharpness of its boundaries” (DeLanda, 2006: 12) and may include processes in which 
“an assemblage homogenises its own components” (DeLanda, 2016: 22). The second 
is coding, which “refers to the role played by special expressive components in an 
assemblage in fixing the identity of a whole” (DeLanda, 2016: 22) – and here he gives 
language and chromosomes as examples. A community, for example, may be 
territorialized by developing normative conformity amongst its members and a hostile 
attitude to outsiders, and this could be supported by linguistic coding processes 
(DeLanda, 2016: 22). Both territorialization and coding are what we propose to call 
regulatory processes or mechanisms, meaning that they tend to stabilize assemblages 
in particular forms and thus to explain their persistence over time. An assemblage 
with high values of the territorialization and coding parameters would therefore tend 
to be a more stable and persistent entity.  
DeLanda’s parameters, then, provide a way of making sense of both relatively stable 
or persistent entities and relatively unstable or fluid assemblages within a single 
ontology. But he also seeks to address the possibility of recurrence of similar entities. 
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Here he makes use of the concepts of multiplicity and diagram from D&G’s work, and 
the concept of attractors from complexity theory which he connects to Deleuze’s use 
of the concept of singularities (DeLanda, 2002: 14, 179). For DeLanda, a multiplicity, 
also referred to as a diagram, is “the structure of a possibility space” (DeLanda, 2016: 
122) – we may think of it, perhaps, as a field of possible assemblages with related 
structures (there is thus some doubt as to whether he uses diagram to mean abstract 
machine, as Deleuze sometimes does). It is not, however, an actual set of historically 
individuated assemblages. Multiplicities, like abstract machines, are virtual (Roffe, 
2010). Deleuze tells us that “The reality of the virtual is structure” (Deleuze, 2014: 
272) and DeLanda reads this to mean that each point in the possibility space is a 
different possible structure for an assemblage. Any actual assemblage represents an 
actualisation or individuation of a point within a multiplicity, but many other points in 
it may remain unindividuated. Notional points that fall outside all multiplicities, by 
contrast, could never be individuated. 
DeLanda, like Deleuze as he understands him,6Fvii refuses to allow types of assemblage 
into his ontology, and as a consequence seeks to minimise talk of resemblances 
between different assemblages (DeLanda, 2002: 38). Nevertheless he acknowledges 
that resemblances may occur, though this always “depends on contingent historical 
details of the process of individuation” (DeLanda, 2002: 39). The concept of 
multiplicity positions recurrence and resemblance as what occurs when two or more 
assemblages individuate the same or nearby points in the same multiplicity (or 
perhaps in distinct but congruent multiplicities). So far, this appears to leave 
31 
 
recurrence and resemblance as nothing more than unlikely historical accidents, but 
DeLanda also invokes the concept of attractors: an attractor is a point in a possibility 
space that states tend to converge on (DeLanda, 2016: 142). If an attractor, or 
multiple attractors, exists in a possibility space then historical processes of 
individuation will have a tendency to produce assemblages that take the 
corresponding form, and we therefore also have a way of making sense of systematic 
recurrence of similar assemblages. 
 
Evaluating DeLanda’s solution 
We may take DeLanda’s work, and in particular his concepts of parameter, multiplicity 
and attractor, as a potential solution to the problem posed in this paper: the need for 
an ontology that can encompass both transience and stability, both difference and 
recurrence. As such it has both strengths and weaknesses.  
Its first strength is simply that DeLanda recognises the need for such an ontology, by 
contrast with thinkers in the assemblage theory tradition like Latour and his fellow 
actor-network theorists, who treat stability as an unusual, temporary and somewhat 
unimportant achievement in a world “filled with currents, eddies, flows, vortices, 
unpredictable changes, storms, and with moments of lull and calm and recurrence” 
(Law, 2004: 7). Like critical realists, DeLanda is a realist about persistent entities with 
continuing capacities that emerge from relatively stable features of their structures. 
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Yet DeLanda is also a realist about less stable and less patterned assemblages and 
provides us with an ontology that recognises both kinds of structure.  
Its second strength is that while recognising both stability and fluidity, he avoids a 
dualistic solution that seeks to divide the world into two distinct stable and fluid 
sectors. Some assemblages are more stable than others, but he explicitly rejects the 
move of seeing all assemblages as irretrievably transient and all the members of some 
other class – strata, perhaps – as persistent and structured. Instead, his continuum 
clearly gels with our experience of the world. Queues are more transient than market 
stalls, which are more transient than nation states, for example. By placing all things 
or assemblages on a scale, the concept of parameters provides a route into seeing the 
distinction between stability and transience as itself a fluid and graduated relation 
rather than a binary one. 
A third strength is that the concept of parameters provides a relatively accessible way 
of describing this relation. It’s easy to imagine assemblages as a class of objects, for 
example, that differ in their degree of transience – so ‘degree of transience’ could be 
used as a parameter on the concept of assemblage, which allows us to apply the 
concept equally to queues, market stalls and states while still recognising other 
differences between them. 
On the other hand, as we will argue below, there are also significant weaknesses in 
DeLanda’s approach. From a critical realist perspective, the most striking is his 
uncompromising rejection of the need for types, classes, or kinds in a realist ontology 
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(DeLanda, 2002: 38). This creates substantial problems. As we have seen, while he 
accepts that there are resemblances between different assemblages, he argues 
“resemblances and identities must be treated as mere results of deeper physical 
processes, and not as fundamental categories on which to base an ontology” 
(DeLanda, 2002: 38–9). This is symptomatic of the orientation of his work to the 
problematic of origins, and the corresponding contrast space: both Deleuze and 
DeLanda contrast their work, in particular, with a genetic notion of essences as 
productive of the forms of things (DeLanda, 2002: 6). They are of course right that 
types cannot generate instances of the type, but this does not entail that we do not 
need types for other purposes in a realist ontology. As Harman has pointed out in 
discussing DeLanda’s work, it is not clear “why priority needs to be given to genetic 
process over fully formed individuals” (Harman, 2008: 373). Genetic processes and 
formation stories are important, but ontology is also concerned with the 
properties/capacities that objects have once they have been formed: questions that 
are highlighted in the problematic of causal power and causation stories. These 
divergent problematics are a significant driver of the tendency of the field to bifurcate 
into structure-oriented or process-oriented ontologies. 
The challenge is that we need an ontology that is responsive to both of these 
problematics, and this requires us to recognise that individuals, for all their 
uniqueness, can also be instances of a type. DeLanda insists that “all assemblages 
should be considered unique historical entities, singular in their individuality, not as 
particular members of a general category” (DeLanda, 2016: 6). But this is a false 
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opposition: unique historical entities can also be members of a general category – 
each of us, for example, is both a unique individual and a person. Each of us has 
idiosyncratic properties, characteristics, and dynamics, but also characteristics that we 
share with other people more generally. Recognizing this tension is important as we 
need to recognise the existence of certain general categories if we are to be able to 
make sense of causality. As Bhaskar argued, we could not make sense of experimental 
science if the causal powers revealed by entities in the laboratory were not also 
shared by other entities of the same type outside the laboratory (Bhaskar, 1975: 13, 
33, 50). Nor would the mass manufacturing of technological products make any sense 
if we could not rely on each well-made instance of a product to behave like all the 
others. What we need is less a grand rejection of general categories, and more a 
means to theorize generalities while recognizing that they are realised in idiosyncratic 
forms.  
For a fuller example, consider a case discussed by Latour in which a group of scientists 
concluded that a tropical forest is able to advance into the adjacent grassland because 
the earthworms in the forest soil are transporting the nutrient-rich soil of the forest 
into the sandy substrate of the grassland via their faeces (1999: 2). While every 
earthworm is at some level unique, the entire argument rests on the assumption that 
earthworms share a number of structural features and hence they are all able to 
burrow in the earth, to consume organic material, to process it in “their particularly 
voracious digestive tracts” (Latour, 1999: 66) and to excrete it at a different location. 
In DeLanda’s terms, we might say that all of these earthworms individuate similar 
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points in a multiplicity – in a sense the multiplicity is his equivalent to a causal type. 
This, however, leaves out some of the most important characteristics of causal types: 
that they occur when individuals share a specific aspect of structure that leads them 
to share certain emergent causal powers, that this helps to make it possible for us to 
recognise, explain and exploit such powers, and that doing so requires that we identify 
the specific shared structural features and mechanisms that confer similar powers on 
entities that are instances of the type.7Fviii Both abstract machines and multiplicities 
seem to be developed to honour assemblage theory’s insistence, driven by its 
orientation to the problematic of origins, on rejecting categories of any sort – while in 
practice reinstating something vaguely equivalent (but less clear and less coherent) 
through the back door. Like Harman, what we “would most miss in a DeLandian 
universe is an adequate theory of causal relations” (Harman, 2008: 381–2).  
What is missing when we exclude causal types is the transposability8Fix of causal 
explanation, upon which most if not all explanation rests. Without types, the finding 
that one earthworm moves soil cannot be applied to other earthworms to generate 
macro explanations of earthworms’ effects on subsoil; without types the finding that a 
rising stock price attracts one investor cannot be applied to other investors or other 
stocks. Without types, the causal explanation of every event would have to be 
developed from scratch, as we would be unable to import causal explanations 
developed in other cases to help with the current explanation. Regardless of their 
official ontology, in practice all causal explanations draw on types in this way.  
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Our other considerations relate to some of the ways in which DeLanda employs the 
concept of parameters, and the specific parameters on which he focuses. The 
ontological status of parameters is not as clear in DeLanda’s book at it might be. In 
discussing the example of an animal (as an assemblage), DeLanda suggests that 
temperature could be “a parameter quantifying the temperature of the animal’s 
environment” (DeLanda, 2016: 56). If it is reasonable to generalise from this case, 
then two conclusions would seem to follow. The first is that that his parameters are 
descriptive of individual assemblages rather than of types or classes of assemblage, 
since the temperature parameter can take different values for different animals on 
different occasions. The second is that parameters relate to actual external causal 
influences that affect the assemblage concerned, and thus elements in each 
assemblage’s causal history. While the first of these conclusions is fully consistent with 
the broader orientation of his ontology, the second is more surprising. We would 
expect parameters to describe structural characteristics of the assemblage rather than 
external causal influences, and DeLanda’s broader work recognises that such 
characteristics are significant, so perhaps the most plausible conclusion is that 
DeLanda intends both. 
The first conclusion seems to limit the usefulness of the parameter concept by ruling 
out the possibility that types of assemblage could also have parameters: queues in 
general, for example, might be considered less territorialized and/or less coded than 
states, just as digital economies might currently be considered less regulated than 
more traditional economies. The conclusion that parameters refer only to external 
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causal factors would also be problematic, in that it ascribes difference to differing 
external influence (reflecting the problematic of origins) at the expense of seeing it 
also as a matter of differing internal structure (reflecting the problematic of causal 
power). From the perspective of understanding the causal capacities of objects, 
including social objects, we need to recognise that those capacities depend 
synchronically on the actual structure of the object and only indirectly on the 
diachronic causal history that brought that structure about (cf Harman, 2008: 373). 
Indeed objects that share the same structure can share the same causal capacities 
even if they have quite different causal histories. Hence variation in structure can be 
more significant than variation in causal history when we are examining similarities 
and differences in the causal capacities of objects. 
Finally, we need to put the specific parameters that DeLanda discusses in a wider 
perspective. Although in the example above he discusses temperature as a parameter, 
much more of his discussion focuses on territorialization and coding. We would like to 
see further discussion of their generality, their specific form, and on whether there are 
other more general and/or more specific parameters that the scheme might benefit 
from.  Coding, in particular, seems to be of limited generality. Language clearly does 
play a role in stabilising and structuring many, most, or perhaps even all social entities, 
but not in stabilising or structuring non-social entities – such as clouds, birds, rivers 
and hydrogen atoms. Chromosomes, of course, do play a role in stabilising and 
structuring birds, but it is hard to see why we should consider them “expressive 
components” (DeLanda, 2016: 22) – this framing anthropomorphises a very different 
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kind of mechanism. It might make more sense to separate these two and to define 
“the extent to which a structure is stabilised by language” and “the extent to which a 
structure is stabilised by chromosomes” as two different parameters – but ultimately 
this strategy would produce a huge number of different parameters. At this point the 
logic of parameterisation seems less useful than the logic of regulatory mechanisms: 
mechanisms that tend to stabilise structures/assemblages.  
Some assemblages are stabilised, for example, by linguistically coded sets of norms, 
while others are stabilised by molecular bonds, others by nuts and bolts, and so on ad 
infinitum. What would it mean to say that there is a parameter for every assemblage 
that expresses ‘the extent to which it is held together by nuts and bolts’, another that 
expresses ‘the extent to which it is held together by linguistically coded norms’, and so 
on? It is not generally a matter of degree whether a particular type of assemblage is 
held together by a particular mechanism, and most of these parameters could 
therefore only take the value 1 or 0. We therefore find it more useful to say that there 
are many different mechanisms involved in stabilising assemblages, and different 
assemblages are stabilised by different sets of mechanisms. 
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Towards a synthesis 
We propose that a version of DeLanda’s concept of parameters can be repositioned in 
an ontological framework that draws more heavily on critical realism but combines it 
with insights from DeLanda and Deleuze, and that doing so will provide us with an 
ontology that is better able to accommodate both transience and stability, 
heterogeneity and homogeneity, difference and recurrence, and allows us to generate 
richer causation stories alongside formation stories. 
It helps to begin by distinguishing different types of assemblage, summarised in Table 
1. First, the term is sometimes used (notably by actor-network theorists) to refer to 
unique configurations of forces that come together to produce a given event. Let us 
call this a conjunctural assemblage. There is a fairly close analogue of this concept in 
critical realism, in which such configurations are invoked to explain actual causation: 
any given event is taken to be caused by a highly contingent configuration of 
interacting causal powers. Second, according to DeLanda, Deleuze uses the term 
primarily to refer to transient and unstable wholes which differ from conjunctural 
assemblages by being distinct from their environments. Let us call these ephemeral 
assemblages. This is the area that critical realism has notably tended to neglect or 
even dismiss. Third, DeLanda also uses the term to refer to relatively stable wholes 
that may have a tendency to recur in similar forms. Let us call these persistent 
assemblages. These correspond roughly to Deleuze’s strata and to critical realism’s 
entities or things.  
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Table 1 about here.  
 
Critical realism focuses on the first and third of these and has tended to assume that 
they can be sharply distinguished from each other. Assemblage theory before 
DeLanda tended to employ some mix of the first two, whereas DeLanda opens up the 
possibility of synthesis by adding the third into the mix. A productive synthesis 
depends, however, on the recognition that these three tend to shade into each other 
in practice – that many cases fall ambiguously between them by mixing elements of 
more than one at the same time. DeLanda’s parameters accommodate the shading 
between ephemeral and persistent assemblages.9Fx 
While assemblage theory has paid considerable attention to the problem of how 
ephemeral assemblages come to be what they are, even if only transiently, it has paid 
less attention to the problems of why some forms of persistent assemblage tend to 
recur. DeLanda’s concepts of parameters and attractors mark an important step 
forward here, but to make further progress we need to attend to the part played by 
specific regulatory mechanisms in stabilising assemblages. While the concept of a 
parameter is useful as a way of describing partial regularities at the level of structures, 
an explanatory social science needs to look beneath these patterns and examine how 
they are produced. For a critical realist, this means that we need to examine the 
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regulatory mechanisms that produce or stabilise the structures (as well as the 
generative mechanisms that produce their causal powers, which tend to be neglected 
in assemblage theory). 
Such mechanisms, as we have seen, are highly varied, yet certain types of components 
are more easily stabilised by certain types of mechanisms and yield certain types of 
wholes as a consequence. Nuts and bolts cannot stabilise atoms into molecular 
wholes, but they can stabilise bicycle wheels and frames into bicycles. Once 
assembled, bicycles tend to have certain causal capacities that flow from the form in 
which their parts have been assembled and the resulting generative mechanisms. 
Likewise, recruitment and training mechanisms are able to manage a turnover of 
individuals within organizations to sustain their structure. These regulatory 
mechanisms stabilise structures that in turn have generative mechanisms producing 
causal powers, for example imbuing certain individuals with capacities that depend on 
their position within the structure (such as the capacity to hire and fire). While these 
mechanisms will be idiosyncratic in some respects, the same or analogous 
mechanisms can be found operating across different contexts, creating similar effects, 
and forming the bases for the identification of typical features.  
We need, in other words, to add types to DeLanda’s ontology: to recognise that some 
things are instances of more abstract types and that they may therefore also have 
particular causal capacities that are characteristic of instances of the type. Thinkers in 
the assemblage theory tradition have often been extremely wary of the concept of 
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type, but we believe that this wariness derives in part from having too crude a concept 
of type resulting from an understandable reaction to the historical abuse of the term. 
We advocate what may be thought of as loose types, characterised by three features: 
(a) An entity is not completely defined by being an instance of a type, so that 
individuals remain unique. All trade unions, for example, are different from each other 
but this does not prevent them from being instances of the type trade union. (b) Type 
boundaries may be fuzzy, so that individuals may be positioned ambiguously with 
respect to them. Is a bicycle still a bicycle, for example, when it has a stabiliser wheel 
added to it? How far must it change to become a tricycle? Is a bureaucracy still a 
bureaucracy if it adopts a flat organisation while serving a similar function as a more 
traditional hierarchical model? (c) Because of (a), objects can be members of multiple 
different types, both nested and crosscutting. A soccer club will also be a sports club 
(a nested type) and may also be a public limited company (a crosscutting type) and 
have features of each.10Fxi 
We can still, however, abstract further. DeLanda’s use of the concept of attractors 
represents an attempt to do so. An attractor is a state that other relevantly similar 
states tend to converge towards. DeLanda makes use of the concept in his own 
account of how persistent assemblages come to be stabilised – the basic idea is that 
some assemblages of parts tend to converge on a particular configuration and these 
tendencies therefore stabilise the assemblage in the configuration concerned. The 
concept of attractor, however, is a descriptive concept that may be mistaken for an 
explanatory concept. Attractors are features of possibility spaces, which are 
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descriptive of what outcomes would occur in what circumstances, and directions of 
movement between different circumstances/outcomes, but say nothing about how 
those outcomes or directions of movement are produced, as DeLanda partially 
acknowledges (DeLanda, 2002: 178–9) . We therefore prefer to say that assemblages 
in a particular structural range have a tendency to persist and recur (TPAR). Such a 
tendency is always the product of  regulatory mechanisms, and as we have seen these 
mechanisms vary depending on the type of assemblage, and may be offset to varying 
degrees by deregulatory mechanisms (Elder-Vass, 2010: 33–8). Nevertheless, the 
TPAR summarises the strength of such mechanisms for any given type of assemblage, 
and thus we see it as a parameter in DeLanda’s sense. Because of its generality we see 
it as a more useful parameter than those which describe the strength (or 
presence/absence) of a specific mechanism.  
While the TPAR of an individual assemblage is significant, the concept also has a more 
general application. If there is a tendency for parts of a certain type to stabilise in a 
particular configuration, this will not only tend to stabilise an individual assemblage 
but also tend to produce recurrence of similar assemblages. These regulatory forces, 
then, explain not only the existence of persistent assemblages, but also the tendency 
for types of assemblage to be recurrently and/or regularly instantiated by different 
individuals. We should stress, again, however, that these regulatory forces may be 
different from, or at most a subset of, the generative mechanisms that produce the 
causal powers of an assemblage. The former contribute to the causal history of an 
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assemblage whereas the latter are the structural basis of its capacity at any one time 
to influence the world. 
Finally, let us make clear the implication of labelling this as a tendency. In critical 
realism causal powers are thought of as tendencies – rather than law-like – because 
their realisation is always contingent, and in particular is conditional on the 
circumstances of any particular event. Consider the traditional nuclear family, 
consisting of a male and female parent and one or more children brought up by them. 
This has been a fairly stable and recurrent form in many social contexts over the last 
few hundred years, and we might therefore consider it to have a high TPAR. Yet 
historically there have been other social contexts where extended families were the 
norm and nuclear families were not, and recent developments have raised the TPAR 
of nuclear families with same sex parents. Clearly stabilisation of family forms 
depends both on the internal structure of such families and also on the wider 
social/cultural context. This perhaps leads us back in the direction of something like 
DeLanda’s distinction between territorialization and coding, reframed as internal and 
external influences on the stabilisation of a form. 
 
Discussion 
With this in mind, it is useful to distinguish between two kinds of ontological 
fluidity/stability, one relating to conjunctures – the sets of causal forces that are 
present or influential on particular occasions – and one relating to structures – the 
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forms of distinct identifiable objects or things. Any plausible ontology must recognise 
both fluidity and stability of both conjunctures and structures. Table 2 summarises 
how all four combinations appear in the ontologies discussed in this paper. 
 
Table 2 about here. 
 
The scope for productive synthesis arises from the shaded boxes in the table: critical 
realism has conceptual tools for dealing with stabilisation and causation that 
Deleuzians lack, while DeLanda and Deleuze provide a means for thinking about 
structural fluidity that goes beyond CR’s rather structured approach.  
We can illustrate some of the messages of this paper by returning to MacKenzie’s 
empirical study of Automated Trading Desk (ATD) (MacKenzie, 2017). (The illustration 
is summarised in Table 3.) As we argued earlier, the early history of ATD – a firm in 
motion, repeatedly transforming itself radically until it found a successful niche – 
demonstrates the need for an ontology that can accommodate structural fluidity.  
Drawing on DeLanda’s approach, we could see this as a case of an assemblage 
converging on an attractor – a locally stable form. Once the firm takes form and starts 
to adapt under the influence of its founders’ agency it fits Archer’s Morphogenetic 
Model (Archer 1995),11Fxii however in the earliest phases when it is still in the process of 
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formation this is a less natural fit. In contrast, the assemblages approach allows us to 
theorise the evolving situation more clearly as new structures come into being. 
On the other hand, Mackenzie’s story also includes clear cases of long term structural 
stability, notably the New York Stock Exchange (NYSE), whose existence and practices 
played a major role in the developments he describes – not only in terms of the 
formation stories of ATD but also in terms of the causation stories to be told; causal 
explanations of stock trading, for example. Neither the NYSE nor ATD, however, are 
pure examples of stability or fluidity; even within the confines of MacKenzie’s case, 
incremental change was occurring in the NYSE, and through most periods of the 
narrative there were also significant elements of continuity in ATD. As we stressed 
earlier, ATD’s story is the story of interaction between relatively fluid and relatively 
stable social structures having features of each in combination.  
In the terms we have proposed here, ATD had a relatively low TPAR, though one that 
increased as it approached a more viable business model, whereas the NYSE had a 
much higher TPAR – and it is hard to see how an institution like the NYSE could be 
accommodated in an ontology of pure fluidity, such as is found in some readings of 
Deleuze. 
 
Table 3 about here.  
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Furthermore, as we pointed out earlier, this is also a story of both stability and fluidity 
in the conjunctural context.  On the side of fluidity, the technologies available to be 
enrolled in trading systems changed unprecedently rapidly during this period. On the 
side of stability, the practice of stock trading and its broader institutional framework 
were relatively stable and from a structural perspective it was in response to this that 
these new forms of technology evolved. The persistence of these institutions also 
enabled profuse recurrence of the objects they supported: stocks, public joint-stock 
companies, and stock exchanges, and tended to stabilise their forms in turn. 
No explanation of stock trading would be complete that did not recognise that these 
stocks and companies themselves are instances of types with common causal 
properties. Let us consider stocks or shares.12Fxiii A share is a socially constructed, 
institutionally secured tradable financial instrument that generally entitles the holder 
to claim a share of the distributed profits of the corresponding firm and to vote in its 
general meetings. Firms like ATD trade in the shares of public limited companies, 
which have the added feature of being freely tradable on public stock exchanges. 
Many thousands of public firms have issued shares and each of them may have issued 
many thousands or indeed millions of shares, but for ATD, all that really matters about 
shares is that they can be traded on a public exchange. Shares are therefore a causal 
type: they all have certain properties in common that enable a company like ATD to 
trade them through a standardised computer system. Those systems rely on the fact 
that, in certain respects, all shares behave in just the same way. Stock trading as it is 
conducted by ATD would in our view be incomprehensible if we were to adhere to 
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DeLanda’s failure to recognise causal types. DeLanda might argue that it is the 
institution of stock trading that accords shares their similar causal powers, but we 
argue that this still entails recognizing shares as a causal type. Of course, the ontology 
of social objects like shares is more complex than that of relatively simply material 
objects like earthworms. The causal powers of earthworms are a product of their 
material composition and structure, and mechanisms that rely on these. By contrast, 
the causal powers of shares depend on their social positioning, as Lawson has argued 
for the parallel case of money (Lawson, 2016). Bhaskar puts the point more abstractly, 
using the concept of intrastructuration (Bhaskar, 1993: 49; Elder-Vass, 2010: 26–8): 
the case where causal powers produced by a higher structure are effectuated by or in 
effect delegated to subsidiary parts of the structure . But the fact that the powers of 
shares are devolved from higher level structures does not alter the fact that they all 
share similar powers which are the product of the same mechanism, which depends 
upon their sharing the same material prerequisites and the structural position that 
builds institutional properties on these “brute facts” (Searle, 1995). This makes them 
all members of the same causal type, as we understand the term. 
We argue, then, that Mackenzie’s study provides support, not only for the general 
need for an ontology that can accommodate both fluidity and stability and both 
formation stories and causation stories, but also for our proposed synthesis as an 
improvement upon Deleuze, Latour, DeLanda and earlier formulations of critical 
realism. The key to arriving at such a synthesis is to avoid metaphysical dogmatism not 
only about the degree of stabilisation of entities and conjunctures in general but also 
49 
 
about the degree of homogenisation of entities. Instead it requires recognising that 
these are ontological issues that need to be resolved empirically rather than a priori 
and any ontology must be able to accommodate this. The role of the ontologist here is 
to accept that both more and less stable and/or homogeneous forms can be real and 
to provide the conceptual tools to allow both to be theorised, often within one and 
the same empirical explanation. 
Conclusion 
Good social research requires a social ontology that is both internally coherent and 
consistent with our experience of the world, including the evidence revealed by 
research. Just as many ontologists take a relaxed attitude to empirical research 
allowing them to cherry pick illustrations in service of the theory, many researchers 
take a relaxed attitude to ontology, allowing them to cherry pick concepts from 
different traditions. But where ontology is merely implicit, it risks inadvertent 
incoherence and logical irresponsibility. Where it is explicit let alone dogmatic, it risks 
discouraging or excluding attention to important aspects of social reality – as, for 
example, does Latour’s explicit marginalisation, verging on exclusion, of discussion of 
social structure (Elder-Vass, 2008; Latour, 2005). Our focus in this paper has been on 
the exclusions or marginalisations lurking in the assemblage theory and critical realist 
traditions of social ontology, and how we might resolve them. 
Those exclusions, we suggest, are at least in part a product of the different 
problematics to which the two traditions have been addressed: the assemblage theory 
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tradition can be seen as a response to the problematic of origins – how do things 
come to be the way they are?  - while critical realism is a response to the problematic 
of causal power – how can things have causal influence? The former problematic 
directs attention to cases of phenomena not-yet-formed and in the process of 
formation, and thus invites an ontology of fluidity. The latter directs attention to cases 
in which already-existing objects interact with each other, and thus invites an ontology 
of stability. 
A full ontology must address both of these problematics, and there are signs of 
recognition in both traditions of their respective absences. The notions of strata, 
attractors and abstract machines at least recognise – but fail to resolve – the  
characteristic absences of D&G’s assemblage theory: its relative neglect of stable and 
recurrent structures, and its failure to recognise causal types. Archer’s morphogenetic 
cycle provides critical realism with a means to analyse structural change, yet it does 
not resolve the lack of attention to unique, heterogeneous and highly unstable objects 
in critical realism.  
An adequate social ontology must find solutions to both of these absences, and like 
DeLanda we believe that the Deleuzean tradition and the realist tradition can be 
synthesised productively to deliver such an ontology. DeLanda’s move, however, 
opens an important conversation rather than concluding it with a completely 
adequate solution. This paper offers two main improvements. First, it argues that the 
concept of parameter should be reshaped to reflect the core issue as we understand 
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it: the graduated distinction between entities with strong stabilising forces and those 
with weaker ones. Second, we argue, contrary to DeLanda, that social ontology 
requires a notion of causal types, for two important reasons: first, many entities do fall 
into types with similar causal properties arising from their similar structures, and 
many phenomena cannot be adequately explained without recognising this, but also 
second and more fundamentally, causal explanation in general rests upon the 
transposability of explanation between cases in which similar causes operate, and that 
this transposability depends upon the presence in those cases of objects with similar 
powers arising from similarities in their composition and structure. Accordingly, 
formation stories are necessarily interwoven with causation stories. 
As our reading of Mackenzie’s study of high frequency trading suggests, explanatory 
social science needs such an ontology: social phenomena are often, usually, or 
perhaps always the product of interactions between relatively stable objects that fall 
into consistent causal types and other far more heterogeneous, unstable, and 
sometimes ephemeral objects. Adopting such an ontology, we suggest, provides the 
basis for causation stories in conjunction with formation stories. If this paper 
encourages those influenced by assemblage theory to pay attention to the stable 
forces as well as the unstable, those influenced by critical realism to take account of 
the ephemeral as well as the established, and sociologists in general to attend to the 
potentials of both relatively stable and relatively dynamic causal forces it will have 
achieved our objective.  
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Notes
 
i The word structure is used in many different ways. For us, objects are structures in one sense 
of the term, and have structure in another, and so the word can be used in both senses when 
discussing social structure (see Elder-Vass, 2010: 76–86). There is also a difference between 
what we might call actual structures and real-but-not-actual structures (see below). 
ii We thank one of the reviewers for pointing out this connection. 
iii We thank one of our reviewers for suggesting this line of development. 
iv For a similar critical realist account of emergent properties see (Elder-Vass, 2010: 16–24). 
v DeLanda argues that this is broadly consistent with D&G, who write that “the opposition 
between strata and assemblages is ‘entirely relative’” (DeLanda, 2016: 123; the internal quote 
is from Deleuze and Guattari, 1988: 392). 
vi The concepts of territorialization, deterritorialization and coding are themselves highly 
unstable assemblages in D&G’s work. Rather than engage in a complicated and potentially 
controversial exegesis of their usage, we rely here on DeLanda’s reading of these concepts, as 
this reading is embedded in the account of parameters with which we are engaging. 
vii One might argue that the concept of strata implies that assemblages fall into types, and 
indeed D&G briefly acknowledge that abstract machines fall into types (Deleuze and Guattari, 
1988: 596). 
viii Causal types must be distinguished from the Weberian notion of ideal types. An ideal type is 
a notional pure case of a phenomenon, often an extreme case that is never actually 
instantiated, such as Weber’s example of charismatic authority. Actual charismatic leaders 
may rely on some element of tradition or rationalised rules in addition to their personality and 
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achievements, but the ideal type is a notional case in which they do not. By contrast, real 
causal types are classes of phenomena, which many actual cases may fall into.  
ix What Bhaskar calls transfactuality (Bhaskar 1975) 
x The distinction between conjunctural assemblages and the other forms is also potentially 
fuzzy, but less significant for the argument of this paper. 
xi In philosophical terms, our loose types are real kinds rather than nominal kinds: “a 
type of entity, all cases of which have a similar micro-structure that gives them a 
specific property, power, or set of such properties and powers” (Elder-Vass, 2012: 
126). Note the use of “a similar” here rather than “the same”. The terms we use to 
refer to these types, such as bureaucracy, bird, bicycle and football club, represent 
nominal categories, which may or may not correspond to real kinds. For further 
discussion of the issues this raises, see (Elder-Vass, 2012: 121–31). 
xii And Bhaskar’s somewhat similar transformational model of social activity (TMSA) (Bhaskar 
1979). 
xiii We use the term stock to refer to the institution and shares to refer to individual holdings in 
a company. 
 
Tables 
Type Definition Theorized by Examples 
Conjunctural 
Assemblage 
unique 
configurations of 
forces that come 
together to 
produce a given 
event 
Latour, critical 
realism 
 
The causes of the 
FrenchRevolution 
Ephemeral 
Assemblage 
transient and 
unstable wholes 
D&G Clouds, protests 
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Persistent 
Assemblages 
relatively stable 
wholes that may 
have a tendency to 
recur in similar 
forms 
DeLanda, critical 
realism, Harman  
 
Atoms, bicycles, 
bureaucracies 
Table 1: Types of assemblages and where to find them 
 
Ontology Conjunctural 
stability 
Structural 
stability 
Conjunctural 
fluidity 
Structural 
fluidity 
Critical 
realism 
“closed 
systems” – a 
partial and 
temporary 
achievement in 
experimental 
science 
Entities falling 
into types with 
real causal 
powers; system 
reproduction 
under the 
influence of 
morphostatic 
mechanisms 
Highly 
contingent 
actual 
causation in 
open systems 
as the norm 
Transformation 
of entities 
under the 
influence of 
morphogenetic 
mechanisms 
Deleuze Strata Strata, abstract 
machines 
More or less 
ubiquitous 
Assemblages 
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DeLanda ? Assemblages 
with high values 
of coding &/or 
territorialization 
parameters 
More or less 
ubiquitous 
Assemblages 
with low values 
of coding &/or 
territorialization 
parameters 
Table 2: Fluidity and stability in three ontologies 
 
Case Conjunctural 
stability 
Structural 
stability 
Conjunctural 
fluidity 
Structural 
fluidity 
MacKenzie 
(2017) 
stock trading as 
an institution 
 
New York 
Stock 
Exchange 
Financial 
technology 
Early years of 
ATD 
Table 3: Fluidity and stability in an empirical case 
 
 
 
